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ABSTRACT
Water authorities search for new collaborations with non-
governmental actors, with the aim of facilitating societal initiatives. 
A comparative case study was conducted to analyze the value 
dilemmas faced by water authorities when they choose to facilitate 
and how they cope with these dilemmas. The study found that the 
most prevalent dilemma is between traditional democratic values 
and efficiency-related values. In the chosen solutions, the latter 
seem to prevail over the former. Casuistry, cycling and hybridization 
are common coping mechanisms. The study shows the potential of 
non-governmental initiatives in the water sector while also reflecting 
critically on dominant administrative values.
Introduction
As in all sectors of public administration, the water sector has shifted from hierarchical and 
highly institutionalized forms of government rule towards a more collaborative approach 
(Fliervoet & Van den Born, 2016; Pierre & Peters, 2000; Termeer, Dewulf, & van Lieshout, 2010). 
Water authorities increasingly collaborate with individual water users, communities, private 
actors and non-profit organizations to reach their policy goals (Pahl-Wostl, 2007; Watson, 
2015). The involvement of stakeholders in the decision-making process has become common 
practice in many countries (Koontz, 2014; Petts, 2007; Schoeman, Allan, & Finlayson, 2014). 
The involvement of non-governmental actors in other phases of the policy process, such as 
policy implementation and evaluation, is less prevalent (Mees et al., 2016).
Recently, however, water authorities have started to explore new, more encompassing 
forms of working with non-governmental actors (Edelenbos, Van Buuren, Roth, & Winnubst, 
2017). They advocate the self-organization of stakeholders and encourage non-governmen-
tal actors to take more responsibility for flood risk management, for example (Johnson & 
Priest, 2008; Nye, Tapsell, & Twigger-Ross, 2011; Watson, Deeming, & Treffny, 2009). Authorities 
aim to work with non-governmental actors as equal partners or even limit their own role to 
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2   S. GROTENBREG AND M. ALTAMIRANO
the facilitation of external actors’ actions (Grotenbreg & Van Buuren, 2016). The initiating 
leadership in projects then lies with the non-governmental actors (Westerink et al., 2016). 
Pahl-Wostl, Jeffrey, Isendahl, and Brugnach (2011) speak of a new water management par-
adigm in which a new balance is set between bottom-up and top-down processes and in 
which narrow stakeholder participation is replaced by broad stakeholder participation.
Water authorities have a lot to gain in these forms of collaboration: embracing external 
initiatives may result in cost savings, generate public support, and lead to innovative solu-
tions to public problems (Alexander, Priest, & Mees, 2016; Nikolic & Koontz, 2007). But the 
authorities also have something to lose when they choose to facilitate external initiatives: 
they have to share discretion over the use of public authority and public funds with non-gov-
ernmental actors (Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2006). This may result in administrative value 
conflicts (van Buuren, Eshuis, & Bressers, 2015; Hood, 1991).
In traditional forms of water management, in which the government is the main initiator, 
financier and definer of the measures taken, classical, democratic values such as state sov-
ereignty, public authority, legality and impartiality dominate. In alternative forms of collab-
oration in which the government facilitates external initiatives, other administrative values, 
such as customization, flexibility and effectiveness, are more important (Edelenbos, van 
Meerkerk, & Koppenjan, 2017). Despite the wish for more collaboration with non-govern-
mental actors, water authorities are also still expected to uphold the classical, democratic 
values. Choosing to facilitate can thus lead to contradictory demands and value dilemmas 
for water authorities (Meijerink & Dicke, 2008). This study examines these dilemmas.
Existing research predominantly describes practices of stakeholder involvement initiated 
by government. Self-organizing initiatives that develop autonomously in society are much 
less studied (Mees et al., 2016). Despite growing scholarly attention to new forms of collab-
oration between state and non-state actors in the water sector, much is still unknown about 
the dilemmas encountered by water authorities when they choose to facilitate external 
initiatives, how they deal with these dilemmas, and with what result. These questions form 
the starting point of this study.
A comparative case study was conducted of two cases in which the Dutch national water 
authority, Rijkswaterstaat (RWS), aimed to facilitate an external initiative. The Dutch water 
authority is an informative object of study because the Dutch water sector is traditionally 
strongly government-led, publicly funded, and focused on risk avoidance (van Buuren et al., 
2015). Collaboration with non-governmental actors is generally seen as a threat to decisive 
and uncompromised action (Warner, 2006). Recently, however, RWS started exploring the 
facilitation of societal and private initiatives (Frantzeskaki, Jhagroe, & Howlett, 2016). The 
water authority wants to go beyond the principal–agent relationship common to formal 
public–private partnerships (PPPs) (Grotenbreg & Van Buuren, 2016). This leads to a situation 
is which many value dilemmas can be expected.
A comparative case study design was chosen to find the relation between different value 
dilemmas, coping mechanisms, and results. In the first case, the water authority accommo-
dated the initiative of a non-profit organization to create a nature reserve. In the second 
case, the water authority searched for private initiators to realize and exploit a tidal power 
plant in a public dam. This selection covers two forms of facilitation: accommodating facil-
itation, in which the authorities react to an existing initiative; and invitational facilitation, in 
which authorities have a role in mobilizing external actors to initiate a project that the 
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authority can subsequently facilitate (Grotenbreg & Van Buuren, 2017). Therefore, the effects 
of different forms of facilitation can be identified.
In the next section, four common ways in which private-sector and civil society initiatives 
are accommodated worldwide in the water sector are briefly discussed. In the third section, 
the relevant literature on government facilitation is examined, highlighting the advantages 
and disadvantages for water authorities of embracing external initiatives. An overview is 
presented of three types of administrative values that can conflict in facilitation practices 
and different mechanisms employed by authorities to cope with these dilemmas. The fourth 
section presents the research design, and the fifth describes the selected cases. The next 
section discusses the analysis and case comparison. The final section closes the article with 
a discussion and conclusions.
From government to governance in the water sector
In the government-led Dutch water sector, water management is perceived as a public task, 
and water authorities rely heavily on their duty of care (Kraak, 2011). Water security is publicly 
funded by taxes, ensuring full cost recovery. As in most countries, there is still a strong pre-
diction and control regime (Pahl-Wostl, 2007), and water management is predominantly 
focused on risk avoidance (van Buuren et al., 2015). Participation by non-governmental actors 
is often seen as a threat to decisive and uncompromised action (Warner, 2006). Recently 
however, new forms of collaboration with non-governmental actors are being introduced 
in the Netherlands. Gradually, and relatively late compared to other sectors and other coun-
tries, external actors are being admitted into the arena (Edelenbos et al., 2017).
Policy instruments for the inclusion of non-governmental actors worldwide
Other countries are generally more progressive than the Netherlands in terms of granting 
non-governmental actors an active role in the provision of services in the water sector. There 
are various instruments through which participation by private and societal actors is pro-
moted worldwide. First, PPPs enable projects to be (partly) financed by private consortia. 
The PPP finance structure gives governments access to alternative debt and equity that 
traditional public (debt) finance cannot provide (Reynaers & De Graaf, 2014; World Bank 
Group, 2014). Second, viability gap funding is an instrument that enables funding by a com-
bination of taxpayers’ and users’ payments. It reduces the upfront capital costs of pro-poor 
investments by providing grant funding, which can be used in the construction phase of a 
project (Farquharson, Torres de Mästle, Yescombe, & Encinas, 2011).
Third, in unsolicited proposals, private actors propose a PPP project to the government. 
Submissions are treated confidentially in their initial stages, but once the financial viability 
of the project has been demonstrated and the government declares it of national interest, 
the project is often put out to public tender, enabling open competition among other private 
consortia. Fourth, tax swaps allow companies to invest in projects proposed by local author-
ities and receive a tax reduction in the following years until the equivalent of the investment 
is achieved (Deloitte, 2014). Whereas the first two instruments are applicable mainly to pri-
vate initiatives where a more traditional public commissioner–private consortium model 
applies, the last two can be used by societal actors such as NGOs, cooperatives, and local 
companies interested in making a contribution to their community.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [E
ras
mu
s U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
0:1
4 0
4 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
4   S. GROTENBREG AND M. ALTAMIRANO
Government facilitation of non-governmental initiatives and its benefits
Government facilitation, as discussed in this article, can be seen as another governance 
instrument through which non-governmental initiatives are accommodated in the water 
sector. It combines elements of PPP and unsolicited proposals. In government facilitation, 
private or societal actors take the initiative to produce public goods or services, and the 
government facilitates this initiative. Ownership of the initiative lies (predominantly) with 
the non-governmental initiator, and there is no principal–agent relation in the sense that 
the government does not act as the commissioner of a project. Government facilitation 
exists in different forms and intensities (Sørensen & Torfing, 2011). Authorities can for exam-
ple actively entice non-governmental initiatives, or they can passively await such action. The 
amount and form of support can also differ; authorities might change rules and regulations 
in favour of the initiative and contribute financially, or they might solely provide a platform 
for non-governmental actors to meet and further develop their plans (Grotenbreg & Van 
Buuren, 2016).
Facilitation of non-governmental initiatives can have many benefits for authorities. It can 
enlarge the reservoir of available knowledge and financial and organizational resources, 
thereby complementing the strengths of the public sector. There can be efficiency gains 
(Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2006; Reynaers & De Graaf, 2014), and facilitation can increase 
productivity and public value creation (Zhang, Crawley, & Kane, 2015). Things can be accom-
plished that the government could not have done on its own. Embracing external initiatives 
can further generate public support and lead to more innovative solutions to public prob-
lems (van Buuren et al., 2015; Wegerich, Warner, & Tortajada, 2014). The facilitated project 
can function ‘at arm’s length’ from centres of political authority; this may offer greater flexi-
bility in decision making, resource acquisition, management, and accountability arrange-
ments (Skelcher, Mathur, & Smith, 2005).
Theory of value dilemmas and coping mechanisms
Different (interpretations of) administrative values
The administrative values in situations of government facilitation of external initiatives are 
analyzed using Hood’s (1991) distinction between three types of administrative values: theta, 
lambda and sigma. Theta values are democratic values; they secure an honest and fair gov-
ernance process. Lambda values relate to quality; they are about keeping things robust and 
resilient. Sigma values are about being effective and efficient, keeping things clean and 
purposeful (Hood, 1991; Hood & Jackson, 1991). These three value types can serve as justi-
fication for different administrative doctrines. Many New Public Management practices are 
for example generally justified by the sigma values, efficiency and austerity. The values guide 
how administrations are organized, the role assigned to the government, how public officials 
perform, what are understood as public goods, and what the government aims to achieve 
(van Buuren et al., 2015).
Based on the literature on public–private collaboration and government facilitation – 
further elaborated on in the next section – Table 1 lists the administrative theta, lambda and 
sigma values that could be at stake in situations where government facilitates external ini-
tiatives. This overview is used to analyze the dilemmas confronted by the authorities in the 
cases because, in administrative reality, it is hard, if not impossible, to meet all three value 
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types at the same time (Rutgers, 2008). The administrative values are not absolute; they 
overlap and may conflict (Koppenjan, Charles, & Ryan, 2008).
Besides a differentiation between different types of administrative values, there can be 
various interpretations of the same administrative value. This variation in interpretation can 
lead to different evaluations of a governmental practice. In the governance literature, some 
authors mention the gains for democratic legitimacy of involving stakeholders and facilitat-
ing external initiatives (Lockwood, Davidson, Curtis, Stratford, & Griffith, 2010; Lupo 
Stanghellini & Collentine, 2008; Thaler & Levin-Keitel, 2016). They state, for example, that 
societal actors such as non-profit organizations are better than the government at identifying 
citizens’ needs (Bode & Brandsen, 2014). Others authors, however, point out that involving 
non-governmental actors in traditional public services could harm democratic legitimacy 
(Skelcher et al., 2005; Swyngedouw, 2005; Taylor, 2007). The difference between these authors 
can be explained by the democracy model that they apply. Edelenbos et al. (2017) distinguish 
a representative, a participatory, and a self-organizing democracy model in this regard.
In the representative model, politicians govern on behalf of the electorate, uphold the 
primacy of politics, and are the first to decide on issues that impact society (Edelenbos et 
al., 2017; Held, 2006). This can be threatened if non-governmental actors enter the admin-
istrative arena (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016). Adherents to this model argue that government 
facilitation of societal initiatives clashes with the public imperatives of democracy (Skelcher 
et al., 2005). In the participatory model of democracy, citizens get the chance to take part 
in the policy- and decision-making process; politicians create the conditions for this partic-
ipation process (Edelenbos et al., 2017; Pateman, 1976). Adherents to this model advocate 
stakeholder involvement in government-initiated processes because it strengthens trust, 
support, and the legitimacy of government measures (Thaler & Levin-Keitel, 2016). In the 
self-organizing democracy model, social issues are as much as possible managed by volun-
tary and democratically self-governing associations. The government’s role is to stimulate 
and reactively facilitate societal initiatives (Edelenbos et al., 2017; Hirst, 1994). Adherents to 
this model assume that a focus on societal actors’ self-organization, accompanied by a mod-
est, facilitative role for the government, enhances democratic legitimacy.
Growing attention is being paid to this last model of democracy, in which co-production 
and self-organization have central roles (Mees et al., 2016; Voorberg, Bekkers, & Tummers, 
2015). It is argued that, in current times of increasingly complex public problems (Klijn & 
Koppenjan, 2016) and decreasing levels of political trust and voter turnout (Mair, 2005), there 
is a need for such forms of governance (Michels, 2011). In the practice of public 
Table 1. relevant administrative values in situations of government facilitation of external initiatives.
Theta values Lambda values Sigma values
legality, rule of law, reliability Quality, robustness, validity Delivery
equality, equity, impartiality, fairness, 
neutrality
strategic clarity (in contrast to 
complexity)
austerity, parsimony, thrift
legitimacy, duty of care, right actor for 
the task
Government control, discretion over 
production 
efficiency, rapidity, productivity
transparency, honesty security (avoiding risks) flexibility
Democracy, responsiveness Government reputation effectiveness
representativeness, inclusiveness professionalism
primacy of politics, government authority Government accountability
public interest, public money for common 
goods
customization, tailor-made solutions
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6   S. GROTENBREG AND M. ALTAMIRANO
administration also, there is a growing tendency to interpret democratic legitimacy more 
from a collaborative or participation perspective (van Buuren, Klijn, & Edelenbos, 2012). This 
perspective does not, however, fully replace traditional, representative notions of democracy. 
Especially on the national level, the idea of the primacy of politics is still very strong (Van 
der Steen, Van Twist, & Bressers, 2016). This means that alternative democratic notions lead 
to contradictory demands and value dilemmas for public authorities.
Possible value dilemmas in government facilitation of non-governmental 
initiatives
A dilemma, meaning ‘two propositions’ in Greek (Hampden-Turner, 1990), is a special form of 
choice in which a complex issue manifests itself; it involves clashing or conflicting values (Klijn, 
Edelenbos, Kort, & Van Twist, 2008; Quinn, Fearman, Thompson, & McGrath, 1996). The literature 
suggests that several such values are to be expected in situations of government facilitation.
If facilitating authorities choose to support external initiative financially, in cash or in kind, 
non-elected actors gain discretion over the spending of public funds. According to some, 
this can cause a dilemma between the primacy of politics (a theta value) and delivery (a 
sigma value). Facilitating authorities no longer exclusively decide how public money is spent, 
what solution is chosen for a public problem, and who exactly benefits. They, in other words, 
have to compromise on production, payoff, and preference discretion if they facilitate 
(Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2006).
Collaboration with, and facilitation of, non-governmental actors have an inclusionary aim; 
authorities aim to include external actors in the governance process. This has the potential 
of enhancing the theta values, inclusiveness and representativeness. But of course, not all 
external actors will be included; facilitation of certain actors inevitably excludes others 
(Alexander et al., 2016). Unorganized, vulnerable, or less educated actors, who are less capable 
of securing government support, are especially at risk of falling behind (Westerink et al., 2016). 
Government facilitation can thus also endanger theta values such as equality and represent-
ativeness. It favours certain actors and can lead to ignoring alternative solutions (Taylor, 2007).
The facilitation of non-governmental initiatives often requires customization: tailor-made 
solutions for a specific project. Customization is a lambda value. This can conflict, however, 
with theta values such as the state’s legality, reliability and impartiality (de Graaf, Huberts, & 
Smulders, 2016). The theta value, transparency, can also be jeopardized when authorities and 
the facilitated external actors come up with tailor-made solutions behind closed doors. 
Facilitation can further harm the lambda value, strategic clarity. The involvement of multiple 
public and private actors leads to great strategic complexity (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016). Facilitated 
projects are less straightforward and could be structured less professionally compared to when 
the authorities do it themselves (Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2006). The lambda value, profession-
alism, could be jeopardized, depending on the quality of the process and its participants.
Facilitating external initiatives can further come at the price of diluted government control 
(a lambda value) and, despite expectations of lower implementation costs (a sigma value), 
it can also lead to higher transaction costs. Collaboration with non-governmental actors is 
often time-, resource-, and skill-consuming for the government (Huxham & Vangen, 2005; 
Watson, 2015). There is a dilemma between flexibility and administrative values such as 
clarity, legal certainty, and decisiveness (Van Buuren, Driessen, Teisman, & Van Rijswick, 2014). 
Authorities are also exposed to reputational vulnerability; they can be held accountable for 
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things that are out of their hands. Other theta and lambda values that could be endangered 
in facilitated projects are government authority, legitimacy, and accountability in the public 
sphere (Skelcher et al., 2005). Finally, there is a risk of diminished administrative capacity; 
the less an authority performs certain actions itself, the less capable it will become of doing 
them (Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2006), and in the long term less capable of judging and 
monitoring their quality.
Coping with value dilemmas
When a dilemma between values emerges in administrative reality, a trade-off sometimes 
has to be made (de Bruijn & Dicke, 2006). Seeking a trade-off is not, however, the only way 
public professionals can deal with a value dilemma (Koppenjan et al., 2008). Building on 
work by Thacher and Rein (2004) and Stewart (2006), Steenhuisen and van Eeten (2008) 
distinguish six alternative coping mechanisms: cycling, firewalls, casuistry, hybridization, 
incrementalism and bias.
In cycling, public organizations address conflicting values sequentially over time. Building 
firewalls means that conflicting values are assigned to different departments; the values are 
decoupled, and each department is made responsible for realizing only one of the values 
(Steenhuisen & van Eeten, 2008). Casuistry entails public officials making decisions for each 
particular value conflict on the basis of their experiences in similar cases (de Graaf et al., 
2016). In hybridization, conflicting values coexist in different policies or practices. This occurs, 
for example, when additions that reflect different values are made to existing policies (de 
Graaf et al., 2016). Incrementalism means that value conflicts are mitigated by incremental 
changes, for example small norm deviations. In bias, certain values are internalized in the 
organization through the dominant discourse, for example by a strong emphasis on ‘safety 
first’ (Steenhuisen & van Eeten, 2008).
Table 2 gives an overview of the coping mechanisms. The research on which Steenhuisen 
and van Eeten’s (2008) typology of mechanisms is based is aimed mainly at public organi-
zations in general, not at authorities, with the aim of facilitating non-governmental initiatives, 
and not specific projects with a limited time span as in this research. It is believed, however, 
that the typology can help elucidate the behaviour of facilitating authorities when they are 
confronted with value dilemmas.
Methodology
To answer the research question, comparative case-study research was conducted (Yin, 
1984), with the aim of gaining in-depth knowledge of complex situations. This entailed 
Table 2. typology of coping behaviour.
source: steenhuisen and van eeten (2008, p. 148).
Coping type Explanation of what happens in a value conflict
cycling Dividing attention on multiple values sequentially over time
firewalls separating institutions committed to different values
casuistry assessing priorities case-by-case among values on a routine basis
Hybridization letting policies or practices coexist with different value bases
Incrementalism mitigating conflicts between values with small stepwise changes
Bias favouring certain values over others through dominant discourses
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8   S. GROTENBREG AND M. ALTAMIRANO
studying a small number of cases in detail to fully understand the situations in all their 
complexity (Blatter & Haverland, 2012; Flyvbjerg, 2001). The two-case comparison revealed 
the relation between different value dilemmas, coping mechanisms, and results. The cases 
were selected deliberately, by strategic sampling. Because of the research design, the study 
will not lead to direct generalizability or ready-made solutions to public problems (Hufen & 
Koppenjan, 2015). It does, however, elucidate new governance arrangements in the water 
sector.
Case selection
Two cases were selected in which the Dutch national water authority aimed to facilitate 
non-governmental initiatives: Marker Wadden and the Brouwersdam Tidal Power Plant. In 
the first case, the water authority chose to facilitate an environmental NGO’s plan to create 
marsh islands; in the second case, the authority aimed to facilitate a private consortia initi-
ative to build and exploit a power plant in a public waterworks. The envisioned form of 
collaboration in the cases is novel in the sense that, in the past, the authorities would prob-
ably have designed and financed the projects, put them out to tender, and commissioned 
only their construction, limiting the private-sector role to that of the ‘hired hand’. Recently, 
authorities have been looking for alternative task division and are delegating the service 
provider role more and more to the private sector.
Both cases related to multifunctional use of public assets; water management functions 
(for safety and for water quality) were combined with, respectively, nature creation and 
energy generation functions. Government involvement in the projects was indispensable 
because the projects related to public assets and because the external initiators could not 
succeed without governmental support. The water authority encountered various dilemmas 
that it tried to tackle with different institutional, relational and regulatory arrangements. 
This makes the cases fit for the research aim. Furthermore, the case selection covers two 
forms of facilitation, allowing exploration of whether and how dilemmas and arrangements 
differ depending on the form of facilitation.
Data collection
The investigation of documentation relating to the Brouwersdam case started in October 
2013. An important part of the investigation was an extensive document analysis of policy 
documents, news articles, and reports on market consultations. The research team conducted 
14 semi-structured interviews with the water authority’s project manager, representatives 
of the other national and local authorities involved, private actors and local stakeholders. 
Several stakeholder and market sounding meetings were also observed.
Research on the Marker Wadden case started in October 2015, also with an extensive 
document analysis. Among other things, a large number of documents disclosed under the 
Freedom of Information Act (Wet openbaarheid van bestuur, 1991) containing the commu-
nication between the government and the external initiator and between different govern-
ment departments were analyzed. Eight semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
representatives of all the national and local authorities involved and the external initiator, 
Natuurmonumenten. The Appendix 1 gives an overview of the documents and interviews 
used in the analysis.
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Data analysis
To gain insight into the value dilemmas faced by the authorities and the coping mechanisms 
they employed to deal with these dilemmas, the process followed in each case was recon-
structed using the collected documents. The decisions made by the authorities in each case 
– and their timing – were identified, and an overview prepared. In the interviews that fol-
lowed, the research focused on these decisions. The respondents were asked why certain 
choices were made, what alternatives were considered, what the pros and cons were of the 
options available, and how they evaluated the outcome. The respondents were further explic-
itly asked about the dilemmas and difficulties encountered in terms of the facilitation of, 
and collaboration with, the non-governmental actor(s). Case-specific situations and govern-
ment facilitation in general were discussed, and the respondents elaborated on the potentials 
and pitfalls of this governance strategy. The identified decisions and dilemmas were coded 
using the list of theta, lambda and sigma values (see Table 1) to determine which dilemmas 
qualified as a value dilemma. The selection of the dilemmas for further analysis was guided 
by the respondents’ judgements of the value dilemmas that they perceived as the most 
important, pressing, urgent, and/or typical of government facilitation situations.
Case descriptions
Marker Wadden
In the heart of the Netherlands lies a large freshwater lake, created in 1930 by enclosing a 
sea inlet. The southern part of this lake is called the Markermeer. The Markermeer barely has 
natural shores; some compare it with a bathtub, and it is relatively shallow. Sediment that 
had accumulated on the bottom of the lake was churned up by the wind and waves, making 
the water very turbid. The deterioration in water quality had a severe impact on the flora 
and fauna in the area.
Over the years, there were numerous programmes, research projects and policy plans to 
deal with these problems. Most of them stalled because the authorities were not willing or 
able to finance the necessary interventions. In 2012, a market consultation was initiated, 
searching for cost-effective measures to create a future-proof ecosystem in the Markermeer 
area. Three private consortia came up with plans, with estimated costs ranging from €282 
million to €1194 million. At the same time, a Dutch non-governmental organization for 
nature conservation, Natuurmonumenten, presented a plan for the Markermeer to the gov-
ernment. It proposed to create a marsh, built from the silt sediment accumulated at the 
bottom of the lake. Estimated costs were €75 million for the first 1000 ha of marsh. The 
project was named Marker Wadden.
In 2011, Natuurmonumenten was granted a €15 million subsidy for the Marker Wadden 
project from one of the Netherlands’ largest lotteries. Natuurmonumenten asked for an 
additional €30 million financial contribution from the government. The prevailing situation 
at the national government was fertile ground for Natuurmonumenten’s proposal. There 
were pressing environmental issues at the Markermeer, but the government did not have 
the resources for an all-encompassing plan. Natuurmonumenten brought a well-developed, 
manageable plan and €15 million of its own resources to the table. Stimulating non-gov-
ernmental actors to take the lead in solving public problems was an important goal of the 
government, and this project fitted this vision.
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10   S. GROTENBREG AND M. ALTAMIRANO
After internal discussions, two ministries decided to contribute €15 million each. Because 
of concerns about Natuurmonumenten’s capacity to manage such a large project, it was 
decided that the national water authority RWS would join Natuurmonumenten in a collab-
orative executive organization and would execute the tendering process. To avoid allegations 
of state aid, a unique, open invitation was sent to private and societal actors to become 
partners in the project. Interested actors had to show their commitment by co-investing a 
minimum of €5 million. Because of this high entry requirement, only the province of Flevoland 
was able to step in.
In 2014, the work was commissioned to a private consortium, and by 2016 the construc-
tion work had started. After the creation of the first island in 2016, Natuurmonumenten was 
responsible for raising the funds needed to complete the first project phase with the creation 
of four more islands. Local and national authorities contributed another €14 million, other 
private and societal actors €11 million. Table 3 gives an overview of the characteristics of 
the cases, including the roles and aims of the different actors involved.
Brouwersdam Tidal Power Plant
The Brouwersdam, constructed in 1971, is one of the world-famous Dutch delta works. The 
dam fully closes off the water behind the dam from the tide. This led to a deterioration in 
water quality; low oxygen levels caused the disappearance of flora and fauna; and the lack 
of tide led to accumulation of sediment on the lakebed. To improve water quality, as dictated 
by European Union legislation, the government developed a plan to partly reopen the dam 
and restore estuarine dynamics in the water behind. Making a breach would be very costly, 
Table 3. case characteristics of marker Wadden and Brouwersdam tidal power plant.
Marker Wadden Brouwersdam
physical project content 100 ha archipelago of marsh islands 
in freshwater lake
tidal power plant in breach in 
primary flood defence dam
environmental urgency medium urgency – deteriorating flora 
and fauna, sediment accumulation
no immediate urgency for power 
plant
administrative history ten years of planning, policy 
development and research
ten years of investigation into 
possibility of power plant 
Initiative and initiator nGo took initiative to create 
archipelago and asked the 
government for help
public authorities invited private 
actors to participate in realization 
of power plant
form of government facilitation accommodating Invitational
Government’s aim support external initiative, benefit 
from additional funds
financially enable breach in dam, 
support (local) business, support 
renewable energy generation
aim of non-governmental 
shareholder(s)
realize appealing project for (future) 
members
profit
stance of non-governmental 
shareholder(s)
active, eager to act awaiting
novelty of governance arrangement novel, collaborative, public–private 
creation of new land
novel, public facilitation of private 
use of public infrastructure
Drivers of successful realization resoluteness of nGo; attractive 
project for both the nGo and 
government; willingness to 
innovate
strong public–public collaboration 
and enthusiasm 
Barriers to successful realization Difficulty finding additional 
participants and funding
limited public willingness to 
contribute financially
progress (July 2017) first marsh island created, funding for 
four more islands secured
no political willingness to finance 
breach, which is a precondition for 
the power plant
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but, thanks to the increasing potential of tidal energy generation, in 2010 the idea emerged 
to realize a tidal power plant in the future breach that would contribute financially to the 
construction of the breach.
In the first phase of the project, in 2013, a joint project bureau, composed of the national 
water authority RWS, two provinces and two municipalities, was installed to investigate the 
feasibility of a breach, including a power plant. From the start, the intention was that private 
actors would design, build, finance, maintain and operate the plant. Because of the many 
uncertainties regarding the business case for this investment, the project bureau started an 
extensive, pre-competitive dialogue and fact-finding process with the market. At the end 
of 2013, there were dialogues, both public and confidential, between the authorities and 
the interested companies. A range of private actors, such as engineering companies and 
tidal turbine constructors, participated. It became clear that a power plant would not lead 
to the hoped-for revenues to cover the costs of the breach; on the contrary, realizing a power 
plant would result in additional costs. However, enthused by the conversation with the 
private and societal actors and convinced of the additional benefits of a power plant, such 
as a positive impact on the local economy, the investigation continued.
In a second phase of the project, in 2014, four private consortia were selected and finan-
cially compensated to further optimize their plans. Parallel to the market consultation, one 
of the provinces joined an EU-funded project researching the best possible technique to 
generate tidal energy at the Brouwersdam. The results were made available to the market. 
Through the whole process, the authorities involved highlighted the collaborative, public–
private nature of the process, speaking of co-creation. The authorities invested substantial 
resources, time, energy and manpower in the consultation, while maintaining their stance 
that the market ‘has to do it’ and the government ‘will solely facilitate’. The recurring govern-
ment message was that the aim was to stimulate the market to come up with an innovative 
proposal and a feasible business plan.
In 2016, in the third phase of the project, the national water authority started preparing 
an integrative, concession-based tender for making the breach, including the power plant. 
According to this plan, the government would pay only for the breach. The winning consor-
tium would be responsible for the design, financing, maintenance and exploitation of the 
power plant, therefore bearing all performance, financial and commercial risks. The govern-
ment planned to facilitate the private initiative by providing several subsidies to the winning 
consortium and by offering compensation for design costs to the private consortia partici-
pating in the design and tendering phase. The plans to realize a power plant are currently 
on hold. Public and private stakeholders await further political decision making on partly 
reopening the dam, which is a precondition for a power plant. To date (July 2017), there is 
insufficient public willingness to finance this reopening. The decision has been postponed 
until after the formation of a new government, after the national elections of March 2017.
Analysis
Marker Wadden
Dilemmas in the Marker Wadden initiation phase
The first dilemma in the Marker Wadden case became manifest when Natuurmonumenten 
presented its plan to the government. The government had just initiated a market 
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12   S. GROTENBREG AND M. ALTAMIRANO
consultation, but Natuurmonumenten decided not to participate officially in this consulta-
tion because it did not want to comply with the accompanying terms and conditions. The 
authorities saw the benefits of Natuurmonumenten’s plan. It was, among other things, sub-
stantially cheaper than the proposals of the private consortia that did apply for the market 
consultation. The situation can be understood as a dilemma between the theta values, legal-
ity and reliability, and the sigma values, delivery and austerity. As Natuurmonumenten did 
not comply with the market consultation terms, it was not operating on a level playing field 
with the private consortia that did comply. Nevertheless, the authorities rated 
Natuurmonumenten’s proposal as ‘too good to ignore’ and decided to include it in the con-
sultation’s results. In terms of coping, the authorities applied casuistry (Steenhuisen & van 
Eeten, 2008); the characteristics of the NGO’s initiative persuaded the authorities to make 
an exception.
Natuurmonumenten contributed €15 million and requested another €30 million from 
the national government. This created a dilemma between the theta values, reliability and 
primacy of politics, and the sigma values, delivery and austerity. The economic crisis had hit, 
and there had been budget cuts in nature development. The government did not have the 
money to realize a large-scale project on its own, and it was therefore happy with 
Natuurmonumenten’s initiative and funds. But it had difficulty finding the requested €30 
million. The entire available budget had been assigned to other policy plans. Eventually, the 
ministries involved decided to revoke and reallocate money previously assigned to the prov-
inces for nature development.
Another dilemma emerged when the government decided to collaborate with 
Natuurmonumenten and contribute €30 million to this project without conducting a public 
tendering procedure first. This could harm the government’s impartiality, a theta value. The 
authorities dealt with this by publishing an open call for expressions of interest in joining 
the project. The entry requirements were steep, however – participants had to contribute 
at least €5 million, and thus no other non-governmental actors joined. Besides the open call 
for expressions of interest, the authorities prevented unlawful state aid by not financing 
more than half of the total project costs and demanding that any possible revenues be 
reinvested in the project. Fearing that they are neglecting public values in collaborations, 
public authorities often introduce rules and regulations (Koppenjan et al., 2008).
The authorities made more tailor-made agreements with Natuurmonumenten. This cus-
tomization, a lambda value, is often indispensable in such an unconventional public–private 
collaboration. There can be a tension, however, between customization and the theta values, 
equality and transparency. A group of landowners filed a complaint about non-transparent 
decision making. Under the Freedom of Information Act (Wet openbaarheid van bestuur, 
1991), the government had to disclose almost all its communication with Natuurmonumenten.
Dilemmas in the planning and design of Marker Wadden
There was internal discussion within the government about the organizational form of the 
collaboration with Natuurmonumenten. Should the government transfer the €30 million 
contribution to the NGO; should the NGO transfer its budget to the government and make 
it a state-owned project; or should they form a collaborative project organization and work 
together as equal partners? Joining the project would cost the government more money 
(in time, energy, manpower and so on) and affect the sigma value, austerity. Eventually, it 
was decided to form a joint project organization to safeguard lambda values such as quality, 
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government control and government reputation. By joining and not only facilitating the 
project, the authorities hoped to have a positive effect on the project outcomes. The author-
ities also decided, at the expense of austerity, to lead the tender of the construction work, 
thus securing the relation established with the market. In terms of coping, this approach 
can be labelled hybridization: the authorities allowed the coexistence of practices with dif-
ferent value bases (Steenhuisen & van Eeten, 2008).
The government’s project goal (improving water quality by reducing mud accumulation) 
and Natuurmonumenten’s goal (creating a nature reserve) overlap but are not identical. The 
authorities involved had some difficulty safeguarding their project goals and indirectly the 
public interest (a theta value). It proved not to be feasible to make the government’s financial 
contribution contingent on the achievement of clearly defined and measurable project out-
comes. Therefore, the authorities refrained from that. To secure some other public goals, 
such as innovation and knowledge development, the authorities set up (and partly financed) 
a parallel learning programme. This is an example of erecting firewalls; different sections of 
the organization now safeguarded different values (Steenhuisen & van Eeten, 2008).
Natuurmonumenten voiced its concerns about the possibility that the government could 
withdraw its financial contribution after future elections and the formation of a new gov-
ernment. The NGO proposed to secure the money by lodging it in an external bank account. 
This caused tension between the primacy of politics, a lambda value – democratically chosen 
political bodies should control the spending of public funds – and delivery, a sigma value 
– the NGO would not continue the project without securing the money. The authorities gave 
in, and the external bank account was created. They applied the coping mechanism of casu-
istry in deciding on this solution in this particular case (Steenhuisen & van Eeten, 2008).
Dilemmas in the creation and exploitation of Marker Wadden
In the realization phase, the government encountered some new dilemmas. The water 
authority RWS, the executive organization, normally follows standardized working methods 
and procedures. This secures legality, a theta value, and efficiency, a sigma value. Some of 
these methods and procedures proved to be a hindrance in the Marker Wadden project. The 
project organization also dealt with this dilemma by casuistry (Steenhuisen & van Eeten, 
2008). The organization decided, for example, to bypass the RWS tender board, a board that 
gives binding advice about the tendering approach. Instead, it established another tender 
board with a more limited mandate. Another example of casuistry for customization is the 
changes made regarding the software that RWS normally works with to track project progress 
and financing, which Natuurmonumenten could not access. The project team therefore now 
works with self-designed systems, custom-made for the Marker Wadden project. The cus-
tomization (lambda) is aimed at enhancing delivery (sigma).
RWS further experienced its dependence on the external initiator, Natuurmonumenten. 
The two parties agreed that the NGO was responsible for raising the additional funds nec-
essary to finalize the project. The authority found it not legitimate (a theta value) to engage 
in this task. When Natuurmonumenten had difficulty raising these funds, endangering 
project delivery (a sigma value), the government helped out, and different authorities 
agreed to make additional financial contributions. This coping mechanism can be labelled 
incrementalism; with small, stepwise adaptations conflicting values were mitigated 
(Steenhuisen & van Eeten, 2008).
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14   S. GROTENBREG AND M. ALTAMIRANO
Table 4 gives an overview of the value dilemmas, coping mechanisms and solutions cho-
sen in the different phases of the Marker Wadden project. A number of trends can be 
observed. The most recurring dilemma is between democratic (theta) values and delivery 
(sigma) values, and in a majority of situations the sigma value seems to prevail in the chosen 
solution. Nevertheless, the theta value was not fully rejected, as authorities chose an arrange-
ment in which delivery or austerity took priority but at the same time the theta value at stake 
was guaranteed to a certain degree. It can also be observed that, when lambda values such 
as quality and professionalism were jeopardized too much, authorities chose to take a more 
dominant, no longer facilitative role – for a specific project phase – at the expense of austerity, 
a sigma value. An example of such a choice is RWS’ decision to take care of the tendering 
process, driven by doubts about Natuurmonumenten’s capacity to organize it.
In this case, the authorities responded to an external initiative, and this led to a reactive 
way of working. It included finding instant, custom-made solutions in reaction to unexpected 
situations. This approach seemed to work in this case; the actors involved are happy with 
the results to date: the first marsh islands have been created. But the process to arrive at this 
result required significant effort, transaction, and coordination costs for the government. 
This could be because this form of collaboration with a societal partner is relatively new for 
the water authority. Future projects could make use of developed arrangements as a blue-
print and require fewer government resources for their preparation. In that case, the resources 
used could be seen as an investment and part of a learning curve to adapt to this new role. 
But if every new collaborative project is as resource-intensive, it is not certain that the author-
ities will find it worthwhile to continue accommodating external initiatives.
Table 4. value dilemmas and chosen solutions in the marker Wadden case.
Situation Value dilemma Coping mechanism
Authorities’ choice, out-
come
Initiation phase
Initiator does not comply with 
market consultation terms
legality (theta) vs. austerity 
(sigma)
casuistry austerity, proposal included 
in consultation result
Initiator requests substantial, 
public, financial contribution
reliability (theta) vs. delivery 
(sigma)
casuistry Delivery, budget reallocated
financial contribution without 
public tender
Impartiality (theta) vs. 
delivery (sigma)
Hybridization middle way, open call for 
participation
formal complaint about 
non-transparent decision 
making
transparency (theta) vs. 
customization (lambda)
cycling transparency, under 
freedom of Information 
act
Planning and design phase
Discussion of organizational 
design of collaboration
Quality (lambda) vs. austerity 
(sigma)
Hybridization Quality, government project 
partner, and contracting 
authority
public goals do not fully match 
external initiator’s goals
public interest (theta) vs. 
delivery (sigma)
firewalls Delivery, public goals in sepa-
rate programme
Initiator fears withdrawal of 
public financial contribution
primacy of politics (theta) vs. 
delivery (sigma)
casuistry Delivery, project budget in 
external bank account
Realization and exploitation phase
standardization does not 
match with project
legality (theta) vs. 
customization (lambda)
casuistry customization, project-spe-
cific procedures and 
methods 
authority dependent on 
initiator’s search for further 
funding
legitimacy (theta) vs. 
delivery (sigma)
Incrementalism middle way, authority 
supports initiator in search 
for funding
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Another point for consideration is the long-term consequences of this way of working. 
The three private consortia that submitted their plans at the government’s invitation were 
sidelined the moment Natuurmonumenten showed up. This could harm the government’s 
relation with market parties and weaken the government’s credibility.
Brouwersdam Tidal Power Plant
Dilemmas in the Brouwersdam Tidal Power Plant initiation phase
In the initiation phase of the Brouwersdam project, the authorities actively searched for 
private initiators and other societal actors willing to participate. This caused several dilem-
mas. First, the involvement of a large number of actors can lead to a complex and time-con-
suming process. Strategic clarity (lambda) and efficiency (sigma) can be jeopardized. It does, 
however, enhance inclusiveness (theta). In this case, the authorities categorized stakeholders 
and shareholders. Selections of them were invited to specific parts of the consultation, with 
a focus on private actors who were expected to provide the necessary private funds and 
information. In terms of coping, the authorities applied cycling. By initially inviting all inter-
ested actors and in later sessions making a selection, they applied different values sequen-
tially over time (Steenhuisen & van Eeten, 2008).
Part of the initiation phase was an extensive, precompetitive market consultation. In some 
cases, private actors wanted to share information only behind closed doors. This caused a 
dilemma between the theta values, legality and impartiality, and the sigma values, delivery 
and effectiveness. Confidential dialogues with a selected group of private actors could give 
the latter unfair advantage over their private competitors. But these dialogues were essential 
for the project’s progress. The authorities found a middle ground in disclosing as much 
information as possible but keeping sensitive competition information confidential. This 
can be typified as hybridization: the coexistence of practices with different values bases 
(Steenhuisen & van Eeten, 2008).
Another dilemma emerged in this initiation phase. The authorities aimed to entice private 
actors to take the lead in the realization of a power plant, among other things by stressing 
the governmental support that private initiators would receive. This hopefully would enhance 
project delivery, a sigma value. But the authorities also had to be transparent (a lambda 
value) about their own limited capacity to contribute to a power plant and their desire to 
‘solely’ facilitate. In the Brouwersdam case, the authorities seemed to focus on enthusing 
rather than downplaying expectations. A potential unintended consequence was an inactive, 
awaiting market that expected the government to take the lead (and as a consequence, no 
private delivery at all). In terms of coping, the authorities applied the bias mechanism: they 
discursively focused on the (private) benefits of realizing a power plant (Steenhuisen & van 
Eeten, 2008).
It was uncertain whether the public budget would become available to realize the breach 
in the dam, which was a precondition for the private realization of a tidal power plant. Despite 
this uncertainty, the authorities started the market consultation process. There was a dilemma 
between reliability (theta) and government reputation (lambda) versus delivery and flexibility 
(both sigma). If no public budget became available after all, the private actors would be 
disappointed, and the government’s reliability and reputation would be harmed. But if the 
budget did become available, the consultation findings would contribute to the quality of 
the project preparation and speed up its implementation.
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Dilemmas in the planning and design of the Brouwersdam Tidal Power Plant
The main dilemma for the authorities in the planning phase of the Brouwersdam project 
was that they wanted a tidal power plant to be realized (delivery, a sigma value), but at 
minimal public risk and costs (austerity, also a sigma value). With the planned tendering of 
a concession, the authorities tried to entice private actors to realize and exploit the power 
plant. The winning consortium would receive a government payment only for the breach; 
the consortium itself would have to finance the power plant, with a limited number of sub-
sidies, such as the subsidy for generating renewable energy. This is another example of 
coping by hybridization: the authorities aimed to realize both delivery and austerity by 
focusing on private responsibility supplemented by public subsidy (Steenhuisen & van Eeten, 
2008).
The design costs in the competition phase proved to be too high for the private actors. 
This endangered the sigma value, delivery. One of the authorities involved therefore decided 
to reimburse part of the design costs of the power plant if private actors lived up to set 
expectations. But this arrangement came at the cost of the sigma value, austerity. The author-
ities applied casuistry as coping mechanism: the developments in the case led them to 
change their strategy (Steenhuisen & van Eeten, 2008).
Dilemmas in the realization and exploitation of the Brouwersdam Tidal Power Plant
Because of its innovative nature, potential private initiators had difficulty attracting investors 
for this project. This again created a dilemma for the authorities between legality (theta) and 
customization (sigma) and between austerity and delivery (both sigma values). As stated, 
the authorities wanted a tidal power plant to be realized at minimum public cost. To reduce 
the risk of private initiators’ not finding the necessary funding and the power plant not being 
realized, the authorities set up an active support scheme for potential private initiators. They 
actively searched for subsidy possibilities; one of the provinces lobbied national and 
European bodies to increase financial support for the power plant. In terms of coping, this 
could be labelled firewalls: the authorities divided tasks in such a way that especially the 
local authorities helped the private actors find financial resources (Steenhuisen & van Eeten, 
2008).
The fact that a privately initiated tidal power plant would be heavily subsidized caused 
another dilemma. Was not a small group of private actors benefiting disproportionately from 
public money? This can be understood as a dilemma between public interest and impartiality, 
theta values, and, again, delivery, a sigma value. The authorities tried to deal with this 
dilemma by stressing that the private initiators needed to invest a substantial amount them-
selves. Another way of coping with this dilemma was to frame private benefits as also being 
public benefits. ‘The power plant will be an international showcase attracting a lot of visitors 
to the region’ was the government’s message. This resembles the coping mechanism cycling: 
the authorities alternately stressed private responsibility and public–private collaboration 
(Steenhuisen & van Eeten, 2008).
Table 5 gives an overview of the value dilemmas, coping mechanisms and solutions in 
the different phases of the Brouwersdam project. Again, most of the dilemmas were between 
democratic (theta) and delivery (sigma) values. The authorities took a more dominant role 
than the discourse about ‘sole facilitation’ suggested, not because lambda values were at 
stake, as in the Marker Wadden case, but because the sigma value, delivery, was endangered. 
The envisaged private initiators had difficulty raising funds and attracting investors, mainly 
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because of the uncertainties regarding the revenue-generating capacity of the project. To 
ensure project continuation, the authorities supported the private actors with lobbying, 
finding subsidies, and reimbursing part of the design costs. This came at the expense of the 
sigma value, austerity, and the intention to ‘solely facilitate’.
The outcome of this governance process remains uncertain. To date (July 2017), there is 
insufficient political willingness to finance the reopening of the dam, which is a precondition 
for the realization of a power plant. The decision has been postponed until after the formation 
of a new government, after the national elections of March 2017. Only after this will the 
success of the water authorities’ actions become clear. Will the private actors take the lead 
in realizing and exploiting a power plant? Until now, the private actors have been relatively 
positive about the project, but it is too early to really take stock. The authorities took a risk 
in initiating such an intensive market consultation. If the project does not proceed due to a 
lack of political will, the private actors involved will be disappointed and possibly less willing 
to participate in future consultation processes.
Case comparison
Although very different in nature, the two cases show comparable dilemmas in the project 
phases. These dilemmas can more generally be expected to emerge in situations in which 
water authorities facilitate external initiatives. In the initiation phase, the emerging dilemmas 
mostly relate to how a successful collaboration can be designed. Inclusiveness, stakeholder 
Table 5. value dilemmas and chosen solutions in the Brouwersdam case.
Situation Value dilemma Coping mechanism
Authorities’ choice, out-
come
Initiation phase
stakeholder and shareholder 
involvement
strategic clarity (lambda) vs. 
inclusiveness (theta)
cycling Inclusiveness, few 
boundaries to number of 
participating actors
confidential talks with 
selected group of private 
actors
legality (theta) vs. 
effectiveness (sigma)
Hybridization middle way, some 
information behind closed 
doors
enticing potential initiators 
with public enthusiasm and 
support
transparency (theta) vs. 
delivery (sigma)
Bias Delivery, authorities not 
always clear about their 
own limited capacity
uncertainty about availability 
of public funding for breach
reliability (theta) vs. 
flexibility (sigma)
casuistry flexibility, market consulta-
tion prior to conclusion 
about budget
Planning and design phase
public desire for innovative 
tidal power plant at 
minimum cost and with 
limited risks
austerity (sigma) vs. delivery 
(sigma)
Hybridization austerity, concession-based 
tender, minimal public 
subsidy
Design costs too high for 
private actors to bear
Delivery (sigma) vs. austerity 
(sigma)
casuistry Delivery, partial compensa-
tion for design costs
Realization and exploitation phase
total investments too high and 
too risky for private actors
legality (theta) vs. delivery 
(sigma)
firewalls strong public support in 
form of (search for) 
subsidies
private initiators benefit from 
public subsidies
public interest (theta) versus 
delivery (sigma)
cycling middle way, private 
investments, framing bene-
fits as public 
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involvement and enhancing local support are important goals of facilitation, but inclusive-
ness inherently encompasses exclusiveness. Certain actors will be excluded, leading to 
dilemmas relating to traditional democratic values such as legality, impartiality and repre-
sentativeness. Here, the discrepancy between a classic representative democracy model 
and a more collaborative model becomes apparent. In the planning and design phase, the 
details of the collaboration arrangement are established, leading to questions about the 
distribution of risks, costs and benefits. Relatedly, dilemmas concerning public interest 
emerge. How is this guaranteed in a collaboration with an actor that has possibly divergent 
interests? The dilemmas in the realization and exploitation phase are mainly about project 
continuation. How can obstacles be overcome?
Table 6 facilitates further comparison of the two projects under study. It becomes clear 
that the value dilemmas, coping mechanisms and outcomes depend largely on the charac-
teristics of the non-governmental initiative that an authority facilitates. The characteristics 
of the initiative partly determine the form of government facilitation, which goes hand in 
hand with certain dilemmas and coping mechanisms.
In the Marker Wadden case, the NGO Natuurmonumenten approached the government 
with a well-developed project plan, a significant budget and a clear interest in realizing the 
plan. The water authority subsequently employed an accommodating form of facilitation; 
it reactively accommodated the external initiative. Consequently, the authority seemed to 
lag behind events somewhat; it had to find a way to deal with every new situation that 
popped up. The ad hoc way of working in relation to accommodating facilitation is reflected 
in the coping mechanisms employed. The mechanisms most often employed were casuistry 
(finding case-specific solutions) and hybridization (letting different values coexist).
In the Brouwersdam case, there was no external initiative beforehand; the authorities 
had to employ an invitational form of facilitation. Instead of passively awaiting a non-gov-
ernmental initiator, the authorities actively searched for one. This is reflected in the types of 
dilemmas that emerged, especially in the initiation phase. These dilemmas all related to the 
question of how the authorities could successfully entice external actors to take the lead. 
The fact that the private actors were not as resourceful as the authorities initially thought 
also impacted the coping mechanism that the authorities had to employ. Cycling was one 
of the most employed coping mechanisms, meaning that sequentially over time different 
values became prevalent. In this case, some firewalls were also erected: the national and the 
local authorities divided tasks, the national authority stressed the private actors’ own respon-
sibilities, and the local authorities helped the private actors attract the necessary funding.
In both cases, the water authority at some points took a more dominant role than envi-
sioned beforehand. The reasons for doing this differed, however: quality in the Marker 
Table 6. case comparison: marker Wadden and Brouwersdam.
Marker Wadden Brouwersdam
environmental urgency medium urgency: deteriorating flora 
and fauna, sediment accumulation
no immediate urgency for power plant
Initiative and initiator nGo took initiative to create archipel-
ago and asked the government for 
help
public authorities invited private actors 
to participate in realization of power 
plant
form of government facilitation accommodating Invitational
main value dilemma theta versus sigma theta versus sigma
main coping mechanisms casuistry, hybridization cycling, casuistry, hybridization
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Wadden case versus project continuation in the Brouwersdam case. This can also be traced 
back to the characteristics of the initiator: the NGO in the Marker Wadden case was less 
experienced in procuring a project; therefore the water authority felt the need to step in.
Another factor that influences an authority’s dilemmas and stance in a project is how 
close the external initiative is to the authority’s own priorities and policy goals. In the Marker 
Wadden case, the national government felt great urgency to do something about the dete-
riorating environmental condition of the Markermeer area and had already conducted a 
market consultation. In the Brouwersdam case, the national and local authorities disagreed 
about which government was responsible for solving the environmental problems in the 
area and how this should be done. If an authority can meet its own obligations by facilitating 
an external initiative, it is willing to do more to let this initiative succeed. In the Marker 
Wadden case, the water authority was willing to make significant adjustments to its standard 
way of working. Significant concessions were made to accommodate the NGO’s project.
Discussion and conclusions
Water authorities search for new forms of collaboration with non-governmental – private 
and societal – actors. The involvement of stakeholders in the decision-making process has 
become common practice, but the involvement of non-governmental actors in other phases 
of the policy process is less prevalent, as is research on this topic (Mees et al., 2016). Little 
has been written about bottom-up initiatives in the water sector; this study contributes to 
knowledge development on this topic.
Increasingly, collaborative and participative views on democracy have reached the water 
sector. But traditional views on democracy in which values such as the primacy of politics 
and government authority are prominent are also still important for water authorities. New 
forms of collaboration in which authorities facilitate non-governmental initiatives therefore 
lead to dilemmas between various (interpretations of ) administrative values. There are a few 
studies that mention these value dilemmas (van Buuren et al., 2015; Meijerink & Dicke, 2008) 
and the diverging democracy models (Edelenbos et al., 2017) that could hinder new forms 
of collaboration and self-organization, yet much is still unknown about the specific dilemmas 
authorities face, and how they deal with these dilemmas, and with what result.
This study adds to the literature by discussing the advantages and disadvantages of 
government facilitation. Furthermore, it introduces typologies of administrative values and 
of mechanisms to cope with value dilemmas (Steenhuisen & van Eeten, 2008) to the academic 
debate on this topic. The typologies are used to systematically analyze dilemmas, coping 
mechanisms and results. The comparative case study design enables an analysis of the rela-
tion between these three elements and of the effects of different forms of facilitation 
(Grotenbreg & Van Buuren, 2017), which is also novel to the field.
The analysis shows that the value dilemmas faced by authorities, their coping mechanisms 
and the results of their actions depend on characteristics of the non-governmental initiative 
and relatedly the form of facilitation employed by the authorities. Another factor that influ-
ences the dilemmas and authorities’ actions is the extent to which the external initiative 
matches the authorities’ own policy goals and priorities.
In general, the most common dilemma is between traditional democratic values and 
sigma values such as efficiency and austerity. In a majority of cases, the solutions chosen by 
the authorities let sigma values prevail. Nevertheless, in doing so, the authorities do not fully 
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reject the other values but take measures to safeguard a minimum level of democratic values. 
The conflict between traditional and more collaborative forms of democracy manifests itself, 
for example, in concerns about the public value of the facilitated projects; the representa-
tiveness of the facilitated external actors; and whether they benefit disproportionately from 
the government’s contribution.
Common mechanisms to cope with value dilemmas are casuistry (finding case-specific 
solutions), cycling (giving different values prevalence sequentially over time) and hybridi-
zation (allowing the coexistence of practices with different value bases). Another common 
pattern is that authorities end up taking a more prominent role beforehand, thereby aban-
doning the initial intention to ‘solely facilitate’. Authorities do this when the quality or con-
tinuation of a project is jeopardized.
In general, the authorities deal with the dilemmas in a relatively ad hoc way. This is partly 
inherent in the spadework they undertake; this form of collaboration with a non-govern-
mental actor is rather new to the water sector. The question, however, is whether the tai-
lor-made solutions they come up with are fit to use in future situations, or whether they will 
have to keep reinventing the wheel. Water authorities might benefit from lessons learned 
elsewhere. In developing countries, for example, working with unsolicited proposals from 
non-governmental actors is common, and Anglo-Saxon countries are more experienced in 
involving the private sector.
Austerity can be an important reason for authorities to choose facilitation. But this study 
shows that facilitation can be a very resource-intensive governance strategy. And an author-
ity that enters a collaboration with an external initiator becomes dependent on the (some-
times lack of ) capacity and the whims of that actor. This requires great flexibility and makes 
the authority vulnerable. When the continuation of a project is endangered because of 
shortcomings in the external actor’s capacities, the authority involved will feel compelled 
to help out organizationally or financially to save the project and the public resources 
invested. This is not unique to facilitation, however; it is inherent in contracting out the 
provision of public services to non-governmental actors. When public assets and public 
goods are involved, the government is a shareholder no matter what, and consequently a 
complete transfer of risks is virtually impossible.
Another pitfall of government facilitation relates to the potential discrepancy between 
short- and long-term effects. Short-term ‘sigma wins’, such as speedy delivery and austerity 
consequent to the facilitation of a non-governmental initiative, could translate into long-
term ‘sigma losses’. A government aiming for more active participation and responsibility 
on the part of non-governmental actors in the provision of water services should carefully 
safeguard administrative values such as impartiality and reliability. If this is not ensured, it 
could harm the government’s relation with market parties and societal actors and weaken 
the government’s credibility, resulting in higher transaction costs in future projects.
This study shows both the potential of facilitation of non-governmental initiatives in the 
water sector and the institutional barriers to it. By doing this, it adds some critical remarks 
and points of reflection to a stream of literature that is generally positive about both the 
desirability and the feasibility of new participation practices. The water sector proves to be 
fertile ground for non-governmental initiatives: they can enhance project quality and deliv-
ery, and water authorities appear to be able to find creative solutions in these innovative 
collaborations. At the same time, however, government facilitation, driven by popular, col-
laborative views on democracy, leads to value dilemmas that are not easy to solve. Living 
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up to traditional democratic values, as is still expected from most authorities, requires the 
development of complex coping strategies.
This study is explorative, in the sense that two cases in the same country in one sector 
are studied in depth. Further research is therefore needed to validate the results and extend 
our knowledge on value dilemmas, coping mechanisms and results in the facilitation of 
non-governmental initiatives in other settings.
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Appendix 1. Data collection
Brouwersdam Tidal Power Plant
Policy and other governmental documents
1.  Projectbureau Getijdencentrale Brouwersdam. (2013). Consultatiedocument Getijdencentrale 
Brouwersdam [Consultation document, Brouwersdam Tidal Power Plant].
2.  Projectbureau Getijdencentrale Brouwersdam. (2014). Verslag Marktconsultatie Getijdencentrale 
Brouwersdam, Hoofdrapport [Report market consultation, Brouwersdam Tidal Power Plant].
3.  Projectbureau Getijdencentrale Brouwersdam. (2014).Verslag openbare informatiebijeenkomst 
Getijdencentrale [Report public information meeting, Tidal Power Plant].
4.  Projectbureau Getijdencentrale Brouwersdam. (2014). Ontwerp Rijksstructuurvisie Zuidwestelijke 
Delta [Design Rijksstructuurvisie South-Western Delta].
5.  Projectbureau Getijdencentrale Brouwersdam. (2015). Brochure Getijdencentrale Brouwersdam 
[Brochure, Brouwersdam Tidal Power Plant].
6.  Projectbureau Getijdencentrale Brouwersdam. (2015).Verslag van de precompetitieve fase 
Getijdencentrale [Report of the precompetitive phase, Tidal Power Plant].
All the above retrieved from http://www.gcbd.nl/Documenten+openbaar/.
Interviews
1.  Project director, Brouwersdam Tidal Power Plant, Rijkswaterstaat, April 2014.
2.  Consultants involved in Brouwersdam Tidal Power Plant, Antea Group, May 2014.
3.  Project member, Brouwersdam Tidal Power Plant, Zeeland Province, May 2014.
4.  Project member, Brouwersdam Tidal Power Plant, Zeeland Province, May 2014.
5.  Project member, Brouwersdam Tidal Power Plant, South-Holland Province, May 2014.
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6.  Adviser, Water Governance, Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment, May 2014.
7.  Policy adviser, Ministry of Economic Affairs, May 2014.
8.  Policy adviser, Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment, May 2014.
9.  Director, holiday Park Marina Port Zélande, May 2014.
10.  Project member, Brouwersdam Tidal Power Plant, Schouwen-Duiveland Municipality, May 2014.
11.  Project members, Brouwersdam Tidal Power Plant, Zeeland Province, June 2014.
12.  Business development manager, Tocardo, July 2014.
13.  Project director, Brouwersdam Tidal Power Plant, Rijkswaterstaat, May 2016.
14.  Project member, Brouwersdam Tidal Power Plant, Province South-Holland, June 2016.
Marker Wadden
Policy and other governmental documents
1.  Rijk-regioprogramma Amsterdam-Almere-Markermeer. (2011). Naar een toekomstbestendig 
ecologisch systeem. Optimalisatierapport Werkmaatschappij Markermeer-IJmeer [Towards a 
future-proof ecological system: Optimization report Werkmaatschappij Markermeer-IJmeer].
2.  Rijk-regioprogramma Amsterdam-Almere-Markermeer. (2012). Een toekomstbesteding 
Markermeer-IJmeer. Eindrapport Werkmaatschappij Markermeer-IJmeer [A future-proof 
Markermeer-IJmeer: Final report Werkmaatschappij Markermeer-IJmeer].
3.  Rijksoverheid, Natuurmonumenten. (2010). Uitnodiging tot samenwerking realisatie Eerste fase 
Marker Wadden [Invitation for collaboration, realization first phase, Marker Wadden].
4.  Rijk-regioprogramma Amsterdam-Almere-Markermeer. (2013). Rijksstructuurvisie 
Amsterdam-Almere-Markermeer.
5.  Rijk-regioprogramma Amsterdam-Almere-Markermeer. (2013). Bestuursovereenkomst RRAAM 
[Governance agreement RRAAM].
6.  Natuurmonumenten, Rijksoverheid, Flevoland, Stichting Groenfonds. (2014). Kaderovereenkomst 
Eerste Fase Marker Wadden [Framework agreement, first phase, Marker Wadden].
7.  Rijksoverheid, Natuurmonumenten. (2014). Overeenkomst tot vestiging erfpacht [Leasehold 
agreement].
8.  Natuurmonumenten, Rijksoverheid, Flevoland. (2014). Samenwerkingsovereenkomst Eerste Fase 
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